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Children and the Law:  
Constitutional Decisionmaking and the 
“Peculiar Vulnerability of Children” 
 
Lois A. Weithorn1 
 
In 2016, in the juvenile sentencing case of Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,2 the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that “children are 
constitutionally different from adults.” Few would disagree with the 
notion that children differ from adults in many ways. At times, courts 
have determined that those differences justify—indeed require—
differential treatment of children and adults under the Constitution. 
In its decisions, the Court has identified “three reasons” for treating 
children differently under the Constitution. It has cited “the peculiar 
vulnerability of children; [children’s] inability to make critical decisions 
in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role 
in child rearing.”3 While much attention has been paid in recent decades 
to the latter two factors, there has been comparatively little analysis of 
how notions of children’s vulnerability relate to constitutional 
decisionmaking. Here, I focus attention on the concept of children’s 
vulnerability, examples of which abound in constitutional jurisprudence, 
despite the absence of substantial discussion of its meaning, parameters, 
and relevance to constitutional decisionmaking. 
Characterizations of children as vulnerable (or not) are assertions 
about aspects of the psychological or physiological nature of children 
that are endorsed or rejected by judges. As such, they represent the 
judicial conclusions about certain facts relevant to constitutional cases. 
Because these vulnerability constructs concern general phenomena (that 
is, characteristics, needs, or responses to certain situations, stimuli, or 
influences of children generally) rather than information specific to the 
parties in the litigation, the constructs have been referred to as legislative 
facts4 when judges offer them as reflecting the true state of the world. 
What should be the source of the “facts” about children’s 
development (or any phenomenon relating to human behavior or 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (2017).  
 2. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
 3. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 4. David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factfinding, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 
541, 552 (1991). 
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functioning) used by judges in resolving constitutional questions? 
Ideally, when assertions about children’s functioning in the real world 
are employed in analyzing and deciding a case, courts’ formulations 
about children’s characteristics should be consistent with the state of 
knowledge in developmental psychology and other relevant health 
science fields. While constitutional cases must be resolved through 
application of constitutional principles, if a court integrates legislative 
“facts” relating to children’s vulnerability into its analyses—as it often 
does when scrutinizing state purposes asserted to justify child-protective 
legislation—those facts must reflect the best available knowledge 
regarding children’s functioning and development.  
Here, I first set out what is meant by children’s vulnerability and 
then offer a taxonomy of subtypes of vulnerability relevant to legal 
decisionmaking. In so doing, I provide a range of examples of how the 
courts have employed constructs of children’s vulnerability in 
constitutional decisionmaking. Finally, I emphasize the importance of 
legal decisionmakers relying on empirically supported and evidence-
based notions of children’s vulnerability, where possible, rather than on 
assumptions about children’s functioning drawn from everyday 
experiences. 
 
What is Meant by Children’s Vulnerability? 
 
The Supreme Court has provided only limited explanation of the 
meanings it ascribes to the concept of vulnerability. For instance, it has 
never explained its choice of the modifier “peculiar” in describing 
children’s vulnerability in Bellotti v. Baird, although we might assume 
the Court is suggesting distinctiveness and atypicality. Some features of 
children’s vulnerability are indeed distinctive, such as those related to the 
natural patterns and pace of the physiological and psychological changes 
children undergo throughout their development, or to the unique role of 
parents in minor children’s lives.  
The terms “vulnerable” and “vulnerability” are used in everyday 
parlance as well as in jurisprudence and scholarship. Yet there is 
remarkably little written to elucidate the nature of the concept as it 
relates to human beings. One dictionary defines the term “vulnerable” as 
“capable of or susceptible to being wounded or hurt physically or 
emotionally” or “susceptible to temptation or corrupt influence.”5 These 
two threads—susceptibility to physical or emotional harm and 
                                                 
 5. Vulnerable, THE RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1997). 
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susceptibility to coercion or other external sources of influence—also sit 
at the core of many philosophical, scientific, and legal formulations. 
Other concepts of vulnerability, such as those relating to immature 
decisionmaking capacities, dependence on others, or socially imposed 
restrictions on freedom, also appear in scholarly literature and 
jurisprudence relating to childhood.  
I developed the following five categories of vulnerability through 
review and analysis of constitutional decisions rendered by the federal 
courts and the relevant legal, scientific, and philosophical scholarship. 
Examples of how concepts within these categories influence 
constitutional decisions will be provided below.  
 
(1) Harm-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as greater 
susceptibility to physical or psychological harm from 
exposure to certain stimuli or situations);  
 
(2) Influence-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability as 
greater susceptibility to influence, pressure, coercion by 
others);  
 
(3) Capacity-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising 
from immature decisional and self-protective capacities);  
 
(4) Status-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability arising from 
legal, social, and situational concomitants of minority status 
and subordination to the authority and control of others); and  
 
(5) Dependency-Based Vulnerability (that is, vulnerability 
arising from greater dependence or reliance on others to 
meet one’s basic needs). 
 
Harm-based vulnerability is one of the most common constructs 
invoked to support treating children differently from adults under the 
Constitution. Concerned about the “crippling” effects of child labor, the 
Supreme Court underscored that a state’s parens patriae and police 
power interests in children’s welfare can serve as the basis for restriction 
of others’ constitutional rights.6 The dangers to the “physical and 
psychological well-being” of children, who are perceived as manifesting 
“particular” vulnerability, are cited to justify the criminalization of a 
                                                 
 6. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944). 
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range of activities related to child pornography.7 Courts have relied on 
notions of children’s vulnerability in determining the constitutionality of 
courtroom procedures that accommodate children as courtroom 
witnesses against alleged abusers and in considering the constitutionality 
of limiting children’s access to reading matter, media, or games asserted 
to be sexually explicit or extremely violent and therefore inappropriate 
for children’s consumption.  
Harm-based vulnerability constructs also appear in the Supreme 
Court’s adolescent abortion cases. The majority in H.L. v. Matheson 
asserted that the “emotional and psychological effects of the pregnancy 
and abortion experience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than 
in adults,”8 while dissenters focused on the special risks to minors of 
being forced to continue with an unwanted pregnancy and childbirth.9 
Images of children as susceptible to harm have also been employed in 
equal-protection cases to emphasize the risks to children of unequal 
treatment. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated that “[t]o 
separate [Black children] from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”10 
Race-based decisionmaking was rejected in Palmore v. Sidoti, where the 
Court determined that assertions about children’s vulnerability to “social 
stigmatization” would not influence its decision, holding that race-based 
factors such as these were not constitutionally permissible considerations 
in determining custody of a child.11 More recently, in expanding 
constitutional protections for the marital rights of same-sex couples, the 
Court cited the “harm and humiliat[ion]” experienced by the children of 
same-sex couples who do not understand why their families are treated 
as “less worthy” of formal recognition under the law.12  
Concepts of children’s influence-based vulnerability appeared in 
Supreme Court decisions as early as 1960s. The Court has relied on 
notions of children as susceptible to the influence of peers, teachers, and 
the government in cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to 
policies allowing school prayer. The Court has cited developmental 
                                                 
 7. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 & 776 (1982) (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  
 8. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1981). 
 9. Id. at 438-39 n.38, 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 11. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-01 (2015); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). 
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research to support its conclusion that children could not be expected to 
flout social expectations and “peer-group norms” that favored 
participation in the religious exercises. Even minors on the verge of 
adulthood may be susceptible to pressures from peers and authority 
figures, according to a 1992 opinion by the Court,13 although Justice 
Scalia rejected the assertion that older minors, such as graduating high 
school seniors, are susceptible to “psychological coercion” in such 
situations.14 Concerns about children’s impressionability and 
susceptibility to peer pressure were also cited by the Court in striking 
down a Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of “creation science” 
whenever evolution is taught.15 
In a series of decisions concerning the constitutionality of imposing 
the death penalty or life without parole on juvenile offenders, the Court 
has invoked a number of constructs relating to children’s vulnerability. 
In Roper v. Simmons, holding imposition of the death penalty to be 
categorically unconstitutional for persons who committed their crimes as 
minors, the Court concluded that “juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure.”16 These assertions were employed again to extend Roper’s 
reasoning in subsequent sentencing cases.17 The Court applied similar 
constructs in determining that children are more likely to feel pressured 
and to submit when adults “would feel free to go” in determining the 
standard for judging whether the interrogation of juveniles is custodial, 
triggering police obligation to provide Miranda warnings.18  
The concept of capacity-based vulnerability focuses on the risks to 
one’s welfare that may accompany immature decisional capacities. 
Those with limited capacities may be less able to protect themselves 
from potential harms or dangers because they are less likely to perceive 
and understand relevant information, to weigh risks and benefits, to 
exercise planning, to employ forethought and deliberative 
decisionmaking, and to use self-restraint against impulsive action. 
Indeed, these are characteristics identified by the Supreme Court in the 
juvenile cases involving sentencing and police interrogation cited above. 
The Court observed that “children characteristically lack the capacity to 
exercise mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to 
                                                 
 13. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578 (1992). 
 14. Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). 
 16. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 17. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 18. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269-70 (2011). 
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understand the world around them.”19  
In Parham v. J.R., a case considering what due process protections 
are required before children are “voluntarily” admitted to psychiatric 
hospitals with parental consent, Justice Burger opined: “Most children, 
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments 
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or 
treatment.”20 In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court’s majority 
opined that minors “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment 
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”21 
Focusing on minors who engage in criminal offending, the Court in 
Roper asserted that minors lacked maturity and were more likely than 
adults to engage in “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions” 
and are “overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of 
reckless behavior.”22 In Miller, relying on scientific research, the Court 
emphasized that “adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions 
and systems related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse 
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance” and concluded that 
“transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess 
consequences” reduced minors’ moral culpability for the criminal acts in 
which they may engage, thus making the harshest punishments less 
appropriate.23  
Status-based vulnerability arises from legal, social, and situational 
concomitants of minority status and subordination to the authority and 
control of others. This form of vulnerability therefore addresses the 
structural effects of being subject to the authority of others. Our society 
and the law governing family relations are structured so that parents are 
authorized to exercise substantial discretion in most areas of children’s 
upbringing—with some limited state involvement. Ideally, adults with 
such authority act to promote the child’s and society’s interests. 
Occasionally, however, the broad grant of parental authority, may be 
viewed as detrimental to children. For example, in Troxel v. Granville, 
Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s high level of deference to 
parental preferences in determining the parameters of court-ordered 
third-party visitation of children by grandparents disregarded the 
children’s liberty interest in maintaining family bonds.24 As such, he 
                                                 
 19. Id. at 273. 
 20. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
 21. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). 
 22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 23. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470-72 (2012). 
 24. 530 U.S. 57, 88-90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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recognized the vulnerability of children to emotional losses from the 
severing of such bonds. In a dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a case in 
which the Court recognized the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of Amish parents to remove their teenaged children from public school 
earlier than the statutorily determined age of school exit, Justice Douglas 
bemoaned the losses to the children of irreplaceable educational 
opportunities resulting from their lack of freedom to choose whether to 
remain in school.25 
In Roper, the Court characterized minors as more vulnerable than 
adults “in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less 
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.”26 
In Miller, the Court highlighted the powerlessness of the offenders to 
escape the violent home situations in which they were living, 
acknowledging that children are less able to extricate themselves from 
home and community situations that promote and reinforce criminal 
conduct.27 In Schall v. Martin, Justice Burger analogized minors’ lack of 
day-to-day control over their lives to institutional detention in defending 
less stringent due-process protections in the context of pretrial preventive 
detention for minors versus adults, in stating that “juveniles, unlike 
adults, are always in some form of custody.”28 
Finally, the concept of dependency-based vulnerability recognizes the 
implicit reliance of children upon others to meet their most basic needs. 
Minors of different ages manifest varying levels of capacity to meet their 
own basic needs. While an infant is incapable of even the most basic self-
care, teens can feed, clothe, and bathe themselves, even if some may be 
thought not to make the best choices in executing those tasks. Needs for 
material sustenance are, of course, fundamental to survival. Needs for 
protection from dangers—such as knives, poisons, traffic, loaded 
firearms—are also fundamental to survival. Yet as decades of 
developmental research confirms, children also have psychological needs 
to be nurtured and loved, to be educated and intellectually stimulated, and 
to be protected from a range of abusive or brutal practices detrimental to 
adaptive human development. In contrast to status-based vulnerability, 
which focuses on vulnerabilities due primarily to the structural status 
relationships, dependency-based analyses focus on children’s needs and 
vulnerabilities arising out of their functional biological and psychological 
reliance on others to meet those needs. 
                                                 
 25. 406 U.S. 205, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 26. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 27. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 477 (2012). 
 28. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 163 (1984).  
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An illustration can be found in DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services.29 Joshua DeShaney suffered permanent 
brain damage as a result of brutal abuse by his father. Concerned parties 
reported suspicions of abuse to the Department of Social Service 
(“DSS”), which repeatedly failed to protect Joshua. The Court did not 
dispute the general premise that a young child is totally dependent upon 
the quality of care provided by those entrusted with protecting his 
welfare. However, the majority and dissent diverged on the question of 
who owed Joshua a duty of care in light of his total dependence on 
adults. The majority concluded that, at least under the federal 
Constitution, no duty of care obliged the state to intercede to protect 
Joshua; duties of care and protection are born solely by the family as a 
private entity. The dissent characterized Joshua as a dependent of the 
state, once the state had begun to rescue, consistent with the policies and 
procedures of its child-protection apparatus. Dependency-based 
vulnerability constructs do not appear frequently in the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional cases. The majority’s analysis and resolution of DeShaney 
may explain why. Our Constitution is generally viewed as protecting 
individuals from government action, rather than bestowing positive rights 
to governmental assistance or services. Constitutional challenges, 
particularly after DeShaney, are less likely to characterize matters 
addressing government’s role in meeting the needs of dependent persons 
as falling within the purview of the Constitution. 
 
Children’s Vulnerability, the Courts, and the 
Current State of Knowledge 
 
One need not resort to scientific sources to observe that most 
children have not yet reached typical adult levels of physiological and 
psychological development on most dimensions relevant to the 
vulnerability typology proposed above. Although age eighteen is a 
relatively crude and often inaccurate point of demarcation for the 
acquisition of the legal and social status of adulthood, general differences 
between children and adults exist. And the Court’s conclusions in the 
cases described indicate just how challenging it can be to try to apply the 
general concept of “children are different” to the specific questions about 
children’s development and functioning relevant to the cases. The 
questions are complicated further in the context of constitutional 
decisionmaking by the need to determine whether identified differences 
                                                 
 29. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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are sufficiently trustworthy, consistent, or meaningful to justify the 
differential treatment required by state or federal legislation or 
regulation, or by those who petition the Court claiming that the 
Constitution requires such differential treatment where the law fails to 
provide it.  
As noted above, constitutional cases must be resolved through 
application of constitutional principles. Yet if the doctrine requires courts 
to integrates legislative “facts” relating to children’s vulnerability into its 
analyses—as it often does when scrutinizing state purposes asserted to 
justify child protective legislation—those facts must come from 
somewhere. One approach by courts is to rely on ordinary human 
experience and to assume that the phenomena of interest are easily 
discerned by all. And where there is a dearth of empirical research 
addressing a question about children’s vulnerability, or any other aspect 
of children’s functioning relevant to a court’s decision, a court may have 
no choice but to fall back on “common sense” and the life experiences of 
the decisionmakers. Yet because the specific nature and degree of the 
differences between adults and children on constitutionally relevant 
questions raise empirical questions, just resolutions will be promoted 
where decisionmaking is informed by the best available developmental 
research.  
In the context of constitutional decisionmaking about children’s 
vulnerability, there exist some excellent examples of courts’ 
consumption of relevant developmental science. In a Confrontation 
Clause case, Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court relied heavily on a 
strong body of psychological evidence in determining the 
constitutionality of allowing child abuse victims to testify via one-way 
closed-circuit television rather than in the presence of the defendant, 
pursuant to a Maryland statute. The statute required individualized 
determinations by the trial court judge as to whether requiring in-
courtroom testimony by the child would cause “serious emotional 
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.”30 The Court 
held that the modifications permitted by the statute were necessary to 
further an important state interest, that is, the protection of the physical 
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims. It relied both on its 
prior decisions and additional scientific authority on the “psychological 
trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court” to 
uphold the Maryland statute. Furthermore, the scientific database 
identified by Justice O’Connor cited in Craig as a “growing body of 
                                                 
 30. 497 U.S. 836, 840-41 (1990). 
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academic literature” also supports the procedures upheld by the Court.31 
There exist a range of situation-specific and child-specific variables 
affecting the psychological impact of participation in criminal courtroom 
proceedings on children. The constitutional requirement of 
individualized findings of necessity by the trial court are consistent with 
the variations among children and situations that result in variabilities in 
the need for these modifications. Along similar lines, the Supreme Court 
has incorporated up-to-date neuroscientific information about children’s 
development into its most recent juvenile justice cases addressing 
sentencing and custodial interrogation. 
Children are engaged in a biologically driven and exceedingly rapid 
process of maturation that is highly responsive to environmental inputs. 
The experiences that occur throughout this process can have significant 
and potentially lifelong effects on their functioning. These factors may 
render children more vulnerable to potential harm, while also presenting 
them with substantial opportunities for positive growth. Developmental 
science, which includes psychological research, neuroscientific evidence, 
and the findings of a range of health science disciplines, while unable to 
answer many empirical questions, can inform others. To the extent that 
the available data elucidate questions about children’s vulnerability that 
must be addressed in a constitutional dispute, familiarity with such 
findings by constitutional decisionmakers is likely to promote a 
resolution more faithful to the underlying constitutional principles. 
 
 
                                                 
 31. Id. at 852-57. 
